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RHODE ISLAND'S CHILDHOOD LEAD POISONING CRISIS
REMAINS PAINTED THICKLY ON THE WALL AFTER
STATE V. LEAD INDUSTRIES ASSOCIATION
I. INTRODUCTION
After a few days of vomiting, decreased appetite, limited energy
and a fever, a four-year-old boy arrived at the hospital.' Doctors
examined the child and discharged him, but he returned two days
later with the same symptoms. 2 That night, the child awoke with an
escalating fever, and the next morning when his mother tried to
comfort him, the child became combative and bit her.3 Tragically,
the boy died within three days. 4 A subsequent autopsy showed that
acute lead poisoning caused his death. 5
Childhood lead poisoning has been, and continues to be, a ma-
jor health crisis in this country.6 For example, five percent of
Rhode Island's children suffer from lead poisoning. 7 In fact, ex-
perts opine that childhood lead poisoning "is the most severe envi-
ronmental health problem" in the state.8 Ingestion and inhalation
of lead paint dust are the leading causes of lead poisoning in chil-
dren.9 Even low levels of exposure to lead can cause learning disa-
1. See Sheldon Berkowitz, M.D., FAAP & Rod Tarrago, M.D., Acute Brain Herni-
ation From Lead Toxicity, 118 PEDIATRICS 2548, 2548 (2006) (providing detailed ex-
planation of child's arrival at hospital and child's symptoms).
2. See id. (noting child's return to hospital after previous discharge).
3. See id. at 2549 (detailing child's behavior and symptoms).
4. See id. (discussing events leading to child's death).
5. See id. (noting cause of child's death). The autopsy also showed that the
child had ingested a charm bracelet made from 99% lead which caused his death.
Id. at 2549-50 (discussing cause of death). After treating this patient, the authors
acknowledged that "[p]roviders should...consider lead toxicity in patients with
unexplained symptoms such as vomiting, developmental delay, hearing loss, behav-
ioral problems, seizures, or anemia." Id. at 2550.
6. State v. Lead Indus. Ass'n., 951 A.2d 428, 436 (R.I. 2008) (stressing extent
of childhood lead poisoning problem nationally and in Rhode Island).
7. See id. at 438 (noting 2005 study showing 5% of Rhode Island's children
suffer from lead poisoning, compared with 2.2% national average).
8. Id. (discussing gravity of childhood lead poisoning problem in Rhode
Island).
9. See id. at 437 (discussing leading causes of childhood lead poisoning). One
doctor said that from January 1993 to December 2004, at least 37,363 of Rhode
Island's children suffered from lead poisoning. Id. at 437-38. In 2004 alone, lead
paint newly poisoned 1,167 of Rhode Island's children. Id. at 438. This number
was "more than double the national average of 2.2 percent" at that time. Id.
(217)
1
Berman: Rhode Island's Childhood Lead Poisoning Crisis Remains Painted Th
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2009
218 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAw JouRNAL [Vol. XX: p. 217
bilities, loss of concentration and behavioral issues.' 0 Exposure to
high lead levels can cause children to convulse and lapse into
comas." I In some severe cases, as exemplified in the tragic situation
above, elevated lead levels in children may even cause death.' 2
This Note will evaluate the Rhode Island Supreme Court's de-
cision not to hold former lead pigment manufacturers liable for
public nuisance in State v. Lead Industries Association (Lead Indus-
tries).13 Additionally, this Note argues that due to a legal loophole,
several of Rhode Island's lead-poisoned children and their families
are left without a remedy.' 4 Part II outlines the history of child-
hood lead poisoning, as well as its causes and effects.' 5 Part III de-
lineates the legal background of public nuisance theory and its
application in the United States. 16 Part IV discusses the court's rea-
soning in reaching its conclusion.' 7 Part V critically analyzes the
court's decision and contends that, although the court reached the
proper conclusion based on precedent, there is a significant flaw in
the law that allows defendants, such as lead pigment manufacturers,
to slip through the cracks, leaving extremely sick children without
any meaningful recovery.' 8 Finally, Part VI assesses the impact this
decision will have on Rhode Island's children, environmental legis-
lation and future use of public nuisance theory against lead
manufacturers.' 9
10. See id. at 437 (pointing out possible effects of low lead levels in children's
blood).
11. See Lead Industries, 951 A.2d at 437 (discussing effects of high lead levels in
children's blood).
12. See id. (noting some effects of severe lead poisoning on children). This
paint contains lead pigment chips and becomes dust when walls and other surfaces
in the home or other buildings begin to deteriorate. Id. Many of these paint chips
and dust fall to the ground. Id. Because children under the age of six are more
likely to play on the ground and their bodies and nervous systems are very sensitive
to lead, young children are more susceptible to lead poisoning. Id.
13. See id. at 458 (noting court's holding that declined to impose public nui-
sance liability).
14. For a further discussion on why public nuisance theory is not applicable
in this situation, see infra notes 179-81 and accompanying text.
15. For a further discussion of the facts of Lead Industries, see infra notes 20-62
and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of relevant background, see infra notes 63-150 and ac-
companying text.
17. For a narrative analysis of the court's decision, see infra notes 151-78 and
accompanying text.
18. For a critical analysis of the court's decision, see infra notes 179-205 and
accompanying text.
19. For a discussion on the potential impact of Lead Industries, see infra notes
206-19 and accompanying text.
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II. FACTS
A. Causes of Childhood Lead Poisoning in Rhode Island
Inhaling or ingesting paint and paint dust in homes is the
main source of environmental lead exposure in the United States.20
Due to the fact that "children spend as much as 80-90% of their
time indoors," their chances of exposure to lead in indoor environ-
ments, such as homes and schools, are very high.21 Additionally,
children have been known to eat lead paint chips because the lead
makes the paint taste sweet.22 Ironically, while lead poisoning is the
most preventable childhood health problem, 23 it is arguably "the
most serious environmental health problem" in Rhode Island. 2 4
Rhode Island's Providence County is one of the oldest industri-
alized counties in the nation, which correlates directly with Rhode
Island's high rates of childhood lead poisoning, as the industrializa-
tion and urbanization led to a greater amount of older homes that
contained lead-based paint.25 In the early 1900s, the United States
Gutta Percha Paint Company, which produced several lead-based
paints, built a block-long factory in Providence, Rhode Island's larg-
est city.26 By the 1970s, ten companies produced lead-based paint
in Providence County alone.27 It is therefore not surprising that
the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development
20. SeeJohn D. Bogden et al., Lead Poisoning: One Approach to a Problem That
Won't Go Away, 105 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 1284, 1286 (1997) (discussing sources of
lead poisoning).
21. Patrick Breysse et al., The Relationship Between Housing and Health: Children
at Risk, 112 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 1583, 1583 (2004) (emphasizing that children
spend majority of time indoors).
22. See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, http://www.epa.gov/reg3
wcmd/lp-faqhealth.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2009) (answering frequently asked
questions and noting lead paint tastes sweet).
23. See Adrian J. Bailey et al., A Tale of Two Counties: Childhood Lead Poisoning,
Industrialization, and Abatement in New England, 74 ECON. GEOGRAPHY 96, 96 (1998)
(explaining seriousness of childhood lead poisoning problem).
24. For a discussion on the seriousness of the childhood lead poisoning crisis
in Rhode Island, see supra note 6 and accompanying text.
25. See Bailey et al., supra note 23, at 97 (noting Providence County's industri-
alization history and pointing to industrialization as one reason for large amount
of older homes in Rhode Island).
26. See id. at 99 (noting history of industrialization in Providence County).
Providence County also contained seven big companies that stored oil and gaso-
line products in the 1920s. Id. Rhode Island also has a large number of shipbuild-
ing factories in addition to a large jewelry industry. Id.
27. See id. (detailing presence of lead paint manufacturers in Providence
County).
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has estimated that three-fourths of the houses built in the United
States prior to 1978 contain lead paint.28
B. Effects of Lead Poisoning on Children
Depending on the level of toxicity and the age of the child, the
effects of lead poisoning may vary.29 Exposure to lead may cause
behavioral issues, cognitive disorders, impaired hearing and slowed
growth.30 Other common symptoms in children exposed to lead
include headache, stomach pain, inactivity and irritability.31 Even
miniscule amounts of lead dust "equal to two grains of sugar a day
on a child's fingertips then transferred to the mouth, for perhaps a
month" could cause a child's "nerve velocity to decrease, making
the child slower, both physically and mentally - perhaps for life."32
The most prevalent health effect from low-to-moderate lead expo-
sure is impaired neurodevelopment, which is analyzed through per-
formance on IQ tests. 33
Furthermore, a low IQ "is deeply implicated in the nexus of
bad social outcomes."34 Several studies link childhood lead poison-
ing at pre-school age with juvenile crime rates. 35 A child who is
lead-poisoned at pre-school age is more likely to commit a juvenile
28. See Bogden et al., supra note 20, at 1286 (noting prevalence of homes
containing lead paint in the United States).
29. See Berkowitz & Tarrago, supra note 1, at 2548 (noting differences in
childhood lead poisoning effects depending on child's age and lead exposure
level).
30. See Asa Bradman et al., Iron Deficiency Associated with Higher Blood Lead in
Children Living in Contaminated Environments, 109 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 1079, 1079
(2001) (detailing adverse effects of lead on children).
31. See Berkowitz & Tarrago, supra note 1, at 2548 (pointing out significant
effects acute lead exposure can have on children).
32. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, supra note 22 (stressing danger-
ous nature of lead paint dust in small amounts).
33. See Scott D. Grosse et al., Economic Gains Resulting from the Reduction in Chil-
dren's Exposure to Lead in the United States, 110 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 563, 564
(2002) (showing lower IQ scores is prominent adverse health effect of lead expo-
sure in children).
34. Rick Nevin, Understanding International Crime Trends: The Legacy of Preschool
Lead Exposure, 104 ENVTL. REs. 315, 317 (2007) (discussing correlation between
lead exposure and low IQ). Lead exposure can cause destruction of myelin
sheaths in children's brains. Id. Studies have linked this myelin destruction to
developmental disorders. Id. Additionally, research shows that impulsive teen be-
havior can be attributed to a destruction of myelin sheaths. Id. A child who has no
disruption in myelination is therefore likely to have a higher IQ and be less prone
to impulse than a child who has destruction of their myelin sheath. Id. Specifi-
cally, a study has shown that children with "IQ of 75-90 are seven times more likely
to be incarcerated than those with IQ of 110-125." Id.
35. For a discussion on the link between exposure to lead at pre-school age
and juvenile crime rates, see infra note 36 and accompanying text.
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crime than a child who is not lead-poisoned. 36 Moreover, studies
associate low IQs with decreased lifetime earning power. 37 Numer-
ous studies also indicate that childhood lead-poisoning dispropor-
tionately affects inner-city children with low socio-economic status
(SES).38
In rare cases, acute lead intoxication can cause symptoms that
resemble a breakdown of the central nervous system. 39 High levels
of lead exposure can even cause a child's death. 40 Despite the elim-
ination of the source of lead exposure, the effects of childhood lead
poisoning are often irreversible. 41
C. State and Federal Attempts to Minimize and Remedy the
Effects of Childhood Lead Poisoning
Beginning in the 1950s, a number of manufacturers stopped
using lead-based paint because they learned of its potential dan-
gers.42 In 1971, Congress enacted the Lead-Based Paint Poisoning
Prevention Act (LPPPA) to study the effects of lead exposure on
36. See Nevin, supra note 34, at 326 (noting tendency toward juvenile crime is
related to childhood lead poisoning). Moreover, the lack of impulse control lead
exposure causes can result in teens committing more crimes. Id. at 317. For exam-
ple, from 1976-1980, the average lead level in the blood for black children ages 6-
36 months was 50% higher than that of the average blood level of white children.
Id. at 326. From 1990-1994, when those same children were still juveniles, the
black juvenile crime arrest rate was five times higher than the white juvenile rates.
Id.
37. See Philip J. Landrigan, Environmental Pollutants and Disease in American
Children: Estimates of Morbidity, Mortality, and Costs for Lead Poisoning, Asthma, Cancer,
and Developmental Disabilities, 110 ENv-rL. HEALTH PERSP. 721, 723 (2002) (noting
link between lower IQ and diminished earning power and lower wages).
38. See Bradman et al., supra note 30, at 1079 (noting correlation between low
socio-economic status and lead poisoning). Additionally, "[m]inority children are
more likely to be living in poverty than nonminority children, and their poverty
contributes to elevated lead levels." Bailey et al., supra note 23, at 97. Children
that live in inner-city areas have higher blood levels than children who live in sub-
urban areas because of "diet, reduced access to information and health care, and
the increased likelihood that they live in old housing and in areas of general envi-
ronmental degradation." Id. Further, minority neighborhoods are more prone to
lead exposure because these neighborhoods tend to be more impoverished and
.public health interventions may be less rigorously enforced in minority areas with
little political clout." Id. at 98. Nevertheless, "access to lead-free public housing
may also explain why some minority groups have lower lead levels than others." Id.
39. See Berkowitz & Tarrago, supra note 1, at 2548 (noting one rare, but se-
vere, effect of lead poisoning on children).
40. For a discussion on lead's effects on children, see supra notes 10-11 and
accompanying text.
41. See Breysse et al., supra note 21, at 1584 (pointing out irreversibility of lead
poisoning's effects).
42. See Bailey et al., supra note 21, at 97 (discussing lead paint manufacturer's
decision to remove lead from paint formula). See also Victor E. Schwartz & Phil
Goldberg, The Law of Public Nuisance: Maintaining Rational Boundaries on a Rational
5
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children, and to eliminate lead from federally-funded housing.43
Nevertheless, it was not until 1978 that the federal government
banned the sale of lead-based paint for indoor use.44
Until 1992, Rhode Island failed to enact legislation to regulate
lead paint in homes, fourteen years after the LPPPA. 45 Rhode Is-
land's first piece of legislation, the Lead Poisoning Prevention Act
(R.I. Act), required blood screening of Rhode Island's children, im-
plementation of programs aimed to prevent childhood lead poison-
ing and educational programs designed to educate the public
about the dangers associated with lead exposure and lead poison-
ing.46 Later, in 2002, the Rhode Island legislature enacted the
Lead Hazard Mitigation Act (LHMA), which, inter alia, required
landlords to correct all lead hazards on their properties.47 Since
Rhode Island enacted and began enforcing this legislation, the
number of lead-poisoned children has significantly declined.48
D. Lead Industries
In an attempt to combat its childhood lead poisoning crisis,
Rhode Island's Attorney General filed a complaint on behalf of the
state against eight former lead paint manufacturers. 49 The State
claimed that these manufacturers, or their predecessors-in-interest,
"manufactured, promoted, distributed, and sold lead paint pigment
for use in residential paint," even though they knew, or should have
Tort, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 541, 557 (2006) (noting some manufacturers took lead out
of paint by own initiative).
43. See Stale v. Lead Indus. Ass'n., 951 A.2d 428, 438 (R.I. 2008) (discussing
initiation of federal program to eliminate lead from homes).
44. See Bailey et al., supra note 23, at 97 (noting that federal government did
not make lead paint illegal for residential use until 1978).
45. See id. at 100 (emphasizing Rhode Island did not enact legislation to deal
with lead paint in homes until 1992).
46. See R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-24.6-2 (2008) (setting forth purpose of R.I. Act).
47. See R.I. GEN. LAws § 42-128.1-7 (2008) (requiring landlords who owned
properties built prior to 1978 to remove lead from those properties).
48. See Lead Industries, 951 A.2d at 439 (discussing decrease in numbers of
lead-poisoned children in Rhode Island since state and federal government en-
acted legislation).
49. See id. at 439-40 (acknowledging manufacturers as parties to action). The
manufacttrers named as parties include NL, Sherwin-Williams, ARCO, The Gid-
den Company, The O'Brien Corporation, SCM Chemicals, American Cyanamid
Company and E.I. Du Pont de Nemours Company. Id. The Attorney General filed
this lawsuit in 1999. Id. Additionally, the attorney general filed the state's initial
complaint against the Lead Industries Association ("LIA"). Id. LIA filed for bank-
ruptcy, however, before the case went to trial. Id. at 439 n.7. After a few amend-
ments to the State's complaint, SCM was no longer a party and Cytec Industries,
Inc. as well as Millennium Inorganic Chemicals, Inc. became parties. Id. at 440.
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known, about lead's hazardous effects on human health.50 The
State alleged that the manufacturers not only failed to warn the
public of lead's harmful effects, but also misrepresented the safety
of lead pigment to the public. 51 The State asserted that the manu-
facturers' actions caused Rhode Island to incur extensive damages
and claimed that the manufacturers were liable for public
nuisance. 52
After seven weeks of trial, a deadlocked jury could not return a
verdict and the court declared a mistrial.53 Subsequently, a four-
50. Id. at 440 (stating State's claim). Moreover, the State alleged LIA aided
and abetted at least one of the manufacturers from 1928 to the time of the com-
plaint. Id.
51. See id. (detailing State's allegations). The claim also asserted that the
manufacturers failed to adequately test the lead pigment. Id.
52. See id. (alleging public nuisance). Further, the State alleged the manufac-
turers were liable for "violations of Rhode Island's Unfair Trade Practices and Con-
sumer Protection Act, strict liability, negligence, negligent misrepresentation,
fraudulent misrepresentation, civil conspiracy, unjust enrichment and indemnity.
The state also requested equitable relief to protect children in Rhode Island." Id.
Nevertheless, the public nuisance claim was the only claim that ended up going to
trial. Id. at 440-41. The State also requested compensatory and punitive damages
and an order mandating the manufacturers to abate lead pigment in all Rhode
Island buildings accessible to children and to fund lead-poisoning prevention pro-
grams. Id. When the state amended its complaint, it eliminated the equitable re-
lief claim. Id. at 440 n.15. The manufacturers motioned to dismiss all the State's
claims. Id. at 440. They denied they had control over the lead pigment when it
harmed Rhode Island's children and that there was a lack of interference with a
public right. Id. Due to lacking control and lacking interference, the manufactur-
ers claimed "they cannot be held liable for public nuisance." Id. The State, how-
ever, argued it was irrelevant whether the manufacturers currently had control
over the "lead-poisoned properties." Id. at 441. Despite the manufacturers' motion
to dismiss the state's claims, the trial court denied this motion. Id.
53. See Lead Industries, 951 A.2d at 442 (declaring mistrial). Thereafter, the
state and manufacturers filed a series of pre-trial motions. Id. When the second
trial finally commenced, only four former lead pigment manufacturers remained
parties. Id. During trial, the State's witnesses testified as to the use of lead pigment
in paint and the effects this usage had on lead poisoning of Rhode Island children.
Id. The court granted the manufacturers' motion as to the indemnification, unjust
enrichment and compensatory damages. Id. Nevertheless, the "court reversed
judgment ... on whether the state had proven a sufficient nexus between [the
manufacturers'] activities and the presence of lead paint in Rhode Island." Id. at
441-42. Afterwards, the manufacturers claimed "the state had failed to prove a
sufficient nexus between [the manufacturers'] activities and the presence of lead
pigment in Rhode Island" and moved for ajudgment as a matter of law. Id. at 442.
The trial justice concluded the jury should decide whether the state had suffi-
ciently proved the manufacturers were liable of public nuisance. Id. The trial jus-
tice explained to the jury that "public nuisance [is] something that unreasonably
interferes with a right common to the general public. It is something that unrea-
sonably interferes with the health, safety, peace, comfort or convenience of the
general community." Id. (quotation marks omitted). Further, the justice added
"an interference is unreasonable when persons have suffered harm or are
threatened with injuries that they ought not have to bear." Id. As for proximate
cause, the trial justice defined it as "a cause that in a natural, continuous, and
7
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month retrial culminated with a jury finding three of the manufac-
turers liable for public nuisance. 54 The court then ordered the
three manufacturers to abate the public nuisance.5 5 This trial was
the longest civil trial in Rhode Island's history, and the first time a
court held lead paint manufacturers liable for public nuisance. 56
The Rhode Island Supreme Court granted the manufacturers'
writ of certiorari after several motions for appeal.57 On appeal, the
manufacturers contended that the trial court erred in denying their
motion to dismiss the State's public nuisance claim.5 8 Further-
more, the manufacturers asserted that the court should have
granted them judgment as a matter of law upon the completion of
the State's argument.59 The court reaffirmed that to successfully
assert a public nuisance action in Rhode Island, a plaintiff must
prove each of the following: (1) the defendant unreasonably inter-
fered with a public right; (2) the defendant had control over the
alleged nuisance; and (3) the defendant actually and proximately
unbroken sequence produces an event or injury and without which the event or
injury would not have occurred." Id. The court instructed the jury on the ele-
ments of public nuisance and emphasized that for the manufacturers to be liable,
the State had to sufficiently prove all the elements of public nuisance and that the
manufacturers were the proximate cause of the nuisance. Id. The justice also in-
formed the jury that if it found the manufacturers liable, the jury would need to
decide which, if any of the manufacturers needed to abate the public nuisance. Id.
54. See id. at 442 (finding defendants liable for public nuisance). The jury
found that Millennium, Sherwin-Williams and NL were the proximate cause for
the public nuisance, so they were responsible for abating it. Id. The jury found
the fourth manufacturer, ARCO, not liable. Id. Soon thereafter, the three manu-
facturers filed several motions, including one for ajudgment as a matter of law, all
of which the trial justice denied. Id. The State also filed some appeals at this
juncture. Id. at 434.
55. See id. at 442 (ordering defendants to abate nuisance). Abatement occurs
when a party takes any measure to try and permanently eliminate lead paint
hazards in residential buildings. 66 AM. JUR. T~iALs § 47 (2008). Specifically,
these measures "include the removal of lead-based paint and lead contaminated
dust; the permanent enclosure or encapsulation of lead-based paint; the replace-
ment of lead-painted surfaces or fixtures; and the removal or covering of lead-
contaminated soil. Abatement includes all preparation, clean up, disposal, and
post-abatement clearance testing activities associated with such measures." Lead
Industries, 951 A.2d at 442.
56. See Lead Industries, 951 A.2d at 434 (stressing trial's extensive length and
importance).
57. See id. (describing Rhode Island Supreme Court's acceptance of appeal).
Additionally, the State cross-appealed the court's denial of compensatory damages.
Id. at 435. The manufacturers had petitioned the Rhode Island Supreme Court
for writ of certiorari in 2004, but the court decided this issue was not justiciable at
that time. Id.
58. See id. at 443 (stating defendants' appeal).
59. See id. (describing manufacturer's want for dismissal). The manufacturers
also claimed the trial justice improperly instructed the jury. Id.
8
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 20, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol20/iss2/3
2009] RHODE ISLAND'S CHILDHOOD LEAD POISONING CRISIS 225
caused the alleged nuisance. 60 Additionally, the traditional use of
public nuisance requires the alleged nuisance to be related to real
property.61 The court ultimately dismissed the State's public nui-
sance claim because the State failed to prove all of the required
elements.
6 2
III. BACKGROUND
A. History of Public Nuisance at Common Law
Primarily originating in state common law, nuisance law is a
tort that "is as elusive as it is ubiquitous in the environmental con-
text."' 63 Nuisance law is traditionally based on the notion that while
private property is sacred, it should not be used to harm one's
neighbor or the public. 64 According to twelfth century English
common law, public nuisance was a tort-based crime for infringing
on the rights of the King.6 5 In the fourteenth century, public nui-
sance grew to incorporate the rights of the people, rather than
solely the interests of the King.66 At that time, public nuisance, a
criminal offense, protected certain rights of the English people,
such as the right to breathe unpolluted air.67 The lack of regula-
tion required the government to develop a way to address problems
with land use and social welfare. 68 To meet this need, public nui-
sance theory developed flexibly and proved useful in a variety of
situations. 69 In the sixteenth century, public nuisance expanded
60. See id. at 446-47 (explaining public nuisance elements).
61. See Lead Industries, 951 A.2d at 452 (noting traditional public nuisance usu-
ally must relate to land).
62. See id. at 458 (noting court's holding).
63. Denise E. Antolini & Clifford L. Rechtschaffen, Common Law Remedies: A
Refresher, 38 ENVrL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYsis 10114, 10117 (2008) (explaining vast
fact patterns nuisance law covers).
64. See 61C Am. JUR. 2D Pollution Control § 1966 (2008) (describing traditional
basis of nuisance law).
65. See Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 42, at 543 (discussing origins of pub-
lic nuisance theory). See also Richard 0. Faulk &John S. Gray, Alchemy in the Court-
room? The Transmutation of Public Nuisance Litigation, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REv. 941,
951 (pointing out "early authority to commence public nuisance actions was de-
rived from the sovereign's 'police power'").
66. See Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 42, at 549 (describing extension of
public nuisance theory to include members of public).
67. See id. at 543-44 (providing examples of public nuisance theory's applica-
tion). See also Faulk & Gray, supra note 65, at 951 (describing public nuisance's
early protections for public). In addition to protecting the right to be free from
unpolluted air and water, public nuisance theory protected the public from disor-
derly conduct and unsafe roadways. Id.
68. See Faulk & Gray, supra note 65, at 951-52 (explaining policy behind pub-
lic nuisance theory).
69. See id. (noting flexibility of public nuisance at time).
9
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into a private tort, thereby allowing individuals "to sue and recover
damages under the doctrine. '70
In the eighteenth century the United States adopted the famil-
iar English common law system, including the theory of public nui-
sance. 71 When the United States shifted from an agricultural to an
industrial society in the mid 1800s, there were few regulations to
control the noise, smells and pollution that new machinery emit-
ted.72 Accordingly, governments used public nuisance when they
"could not anticipate and explicitly prohibit or regulate through
legislation all the particular activities that might injure or annoy the
general public. '73
B. Modern Public Nuisance Theory
Even though governments used public nuisance to regulate
sweeping social problems, the theory was expanded to include ordi-
nances and statutes that specifically defined what conduct consti-
tuted a public nuisance at the federal, state and local level.74 Both
"comprehensive statutory and regulatory schemes" set forth appro-
priate societal behavior during the New Deal in the 1930s. 75 As
these statutes and regulations became more prevalent, common law
public nuisance theory was no longer needed to define which be-
haviors were punishable by law. 76
In the 1960s, public nuisance theory resurfaced when the draft-
ers of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (Second Restatement) attempted
to limit public nuisance theory to only violations of criminal stat-
70. Id. at 952 (noting expansion of public nuisance theory into private tort).
Nonetheless, for a private citizen to use public nuisance, that person needed to
prove that he suffered a special injury different in kind, not just degree, from the
injury the general public suffered. Id. at 953-54.
71. See id. at 953 (discussing United States' adoption of English common law
public nuisance theory).
72. See Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 42, at 546 (demonstrating new
problems that arose during industrialization of United States).
73. Donald G. Gifford, Public Nuisance as a Mass Products Liability Tort, 71 U.
CIN. L. REv. 741, 804 (2003) (discussing need for public nuisance theory to deal
with problems from United States' industrialization).
74. See Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 42, at 546 (noting use of statutes to
regulate industrialization). Moreover, the majority of these statutes authorized
governments to abate conduct specifically defined as public nuisance in the ordi-
nances and statutes. Id.
75. See id. at 546 (discussing lack of need for public nuisance theory). To that
end, the 1939 Torts Restatement did not even include public nuisance. Faulk &
Gray, supra note 65, at 954 (describing near disappearance of public nuisance the-
ory in United States).
76. See Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 42, at 546 (discussing effect of specifi-
cation of public nuisances).
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utes. 77 Environmentalists, however, thought it was essential that
public nuisance theory created civil liability for those responsible
for causing pollution, even though pollution was sanctioned
through non-criminal statutes and regulations. 78 To address envi-
ronmentalists' concerns, the drafters of the Second Restatement de-
fined public nuisance as "an unreasonable interference with a
public right."79 Yet, the Second Restatement emphasized that if a de-
fendant's conduct "does not come within one of the traditional cat-
egories of the common law crime of public nuisance or is not
prohibited by a legislative act, the court is acting without an estab-
lished and recognized standard."80
C. Wave of Public Nuisance Claims in Environmental Cases
In the 1970s, a California appellate court rejected environmen-
tal advocates' use of public nuisance theory in a class action suit
against the defendant automobile manufacturers, petroleum refin-
ers and individual polluters in Diamond v. General Motors Corp.8 1
The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants emitted harmful pollu-
tants and odors into the atmosphere.8 2 Although the appellate
court affirmed the trial court's decision to dismiss the plaintiffs'
claim, the court emphasized that "[t]he dismissal was not on the
merits... [nor] a bar either to individual actions, or to other class
actions appropriately framed.183 Nevertheless, the court concluded
that to recover under public nuisance in this situation, each and
every person in the class would have to prove specific injury.8 4 Due
to such an incredibly high burden, the plaintiffs failed to provide
enough evidence that would make one defendant vicariously liable
77. See id. at 547-48 (noting revival of public nuisance theory).
78. See Faulk & Gray, supra note 65, at 955 (pointing out environmentalists'
concerns with public nuisance theory's description in Restatement (Second) of
Torts)).
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. e (1979) (defining public
nuisance).
80. Id. (stressing if common law or legislative act does not prohibit conduct,
courts are acting without authority in holding party liable for public nuisance).
Environmentalists also sought to establish standing for individual members of the
public to sue under public nuisance theory, and sought to change the standard so
that anyone who suffered from the nuisance could sue using the theory, regardless
if they suffered a special injury. Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 42, at 547-48.
81. 20 Cal. App. 3d 374, 378 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971) (refusing to allow plaintiffs
to assert public nuisance claim).
82. See id. at 377 (discussing plaintiffs claims).
83. Id. at 378 (emphasizing that court dismissed claim for procedural reasons
only).
84. See id. at 378 (discussing necessity of special injury for individuals to re-
cover under public nuisance theory).
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for the conduct of the other defendants.8 5 The court noted that
the plaintiffs merely asked the court to do the job of the legislature:
to create stricter standards for the emission of pollutants into the
atmosphere.8 6 As such, the California Court of Appeals affirmed
the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' public nuisance claim.8 7
In 1974, the Florida Supreme Court, in U.S. Steel Corp. v. Save
Sand Key, Inc. (Save Sand Key, Inc.),88 held that a non-profit organi-
zation comprised of private citizens did not have standing to sue a
corporation under public nuisance theory. 89 The plaintiff com-
plained that the defendant, a large corporation that was building a
resort on a public beach, was liable for public nuisance for blocking
the plaintiffs use of part of the beach.90 To that end, the plaintiff
sought to prohibit the corporation from blocking plaintiffs use of
the beach in the future. 9' Despite the appellate court's decision,
concluding that the plaintiff had a legitimate claim, the Florida Su-
preme Court dismissed it and held that the plaintiff failed to prove
any non-special damages different from those suffered by the gen-
eral public.92 The plaintiff, therefore, had no standing to sue
under public nuisance theory.93
Yet, two cases in the 1980s allowed plaintiffs to use public nui-
sance theory in claims against manufacturers. In the first case, Akau
v. Olohana Corp.,94 the Supreme Court of Hawaii permitted individ-
ual members of the public to sue a corporation under public nui-
sance theory, even though these individuals did not suffer injuries
"different in kind" from the general public.95 The plaintiffs
claimed that the defendant, a large corporation, created a public
nuisance by blocking the plaintiffs' access to trails leading to public
beaches. 96 Relying on a new trend in tax law, the court broadened
the test for standing to bring a public nuisance suit.97 The Su-
85. See id. at 379 (noting that plaintiff failed to provide ample evidence).
86. See Diamond, 20 Cal.App.3d at 379 (outlining separation of powers
argument).
87. See id. at 382-83 (dismissing class action public nuisance claim due).
88. 303 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974).
89. See id. at 11,13 (dismissing plaintiffs' claim).
90. See id. at 9-10 (stating plaintiffs' claim).
91. See id. at 10 (laying out damages plaintiffs sought).
92. See id. at 11, 13 (noting plaintiffs failure to prove special damages).
93. See Save Sand Key, Inc., 303 So.2d at 11, 13 (dismissing plaintiffs' claim).
94. 652 P.2d 1130 (Haw. 1982).
95. See id. at 1134 (allowing plaintiffs to sue under public nuisance theory).
96. See id. at 1132 (outlining plaintiffs' claims).
97. See id. at 1133 (noting court's reliance on tax law to illustrate trend in
expanding standing requirement).
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preme Court of Hawaii concluded that, if an individual member of
the public can prove injury in fact, the person "has standing to sue
to enforce the rights of the public even though his injury is not
different in kind from the public's generally. '98 Nevertheless, no
other court has followed this reasoning in allowing individuals to
sue for public nuisance without proving special injury.99
In the second case, State v. Schenectady Chemicals, Inc.,' 00 a New
York appellate court allowed the State to use public nuisance theory
against a chemical company, holding that "someone must pay to
correct the [pollution] problem."'01 The defendant chemical com-
pany had manufactured paints and other chemicals since the early
1900s. 10 2 The defendant knew that waste improperly disposed of
would be harmful to plants, animals and humans.103 As a result,
the defendant hired a contractor to dispose of the waste produced
by these chemicals. 10 4 The State asserted that in addition to know-
ing that the contractor was .improperly disposing of the chemical
waste, the defendant failed to advise the contractor of proper dispo-
sal means, thereby causing the contractor to continue the improper
disposal.10 5 Due to the defendant's conduct, the State claimed the
chemical waste contaminated and polluted both the ground water
and the air, which constituted a public nuisance.10 6 To "meet a
desired end" in having someone pay for the contamination, the
court concluded that the State's complaint alleged a legitimate
cause of action for nuisance.10 7
98. Id. at 1134 (noting that so long as nuisance affected individuals and
caused injury, plaintiffs could recover under public nuisance theory).
99. See Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 42, at 550 (highlighting that no other
court has followed Akau decision). Most courts do not allow these types of public
nuisance claims when the elements are not met, just because the ends justify the
means. Id. at 551.
100. 459 N.Y.S.2d 971 (N.Y. 1983).
101. Id. at 977 (explaining court's reasoning for allowing plaintiff's claim).
102. See id. at 974 (listing and describing chemicals defendant created).
103. See id. (indicating defendant's knowledge of products' possible harmful
effects).
104. See id. (acknowledging that defendant hired contractor to remove waste
by dumping directly into lagoons and burying at chemical waste site).
105. See Schenectady Chem., Inc., 459 N.Y.S.2d at 974 (pointing out defendant's
failure to take appropriate action in advising contractor of waste material's danger-
ousness and to recommend proper disposal methods).
106. See id. (explaining that plaintiff brought suit because defendant polluted
at least one of area's drinking wells and refused to pay clean up costs).
107. See id. at 977 (concluding public nuisance claim existed). See also
Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 42, at 550 (noting that court found plaintiff had
legitimate claim as means to desired end).
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Approximately a decade later, the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals upheld a lower court's summary judgment ruling in favor of
an oil company in Alaska Native Class v. Exxon Corp.10 8 Due to the
defendant's oil spill, the plaintiffs contended that they could no
longer maintain their "subsistence way of life" because they were
unable to fish in the nearby waters.10 9 The court maintained that to
recover economic damages under public nuisance, a plaintiff must
prove special injury, which is defined as an injury that is different in
kind, not just different in degree. 110 Here, because plaintiffs failed
to prove that defendant's oil spill caused them to suffer a different
injury than the public as a whole, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
lower court's summary judgment in favor of the defendant.111
D. Public Nuisance Claims against Product Manufacturers that
Did Not Involve Land
In an attempt to side-step products liability rules, attorneys
over the last few decades have tried to use public nuisance theory in
cases against manufacturers not involving land. 1 2 The 1980s and
1990s marked the birth of a wide use of public nuisance theory
where a product itself was the alleged nuisance. 1 3 Although the
products were "lawfully manufactured, distributed, and sold[,]" the
plaintiffs complained that the products interfered with the "public's
right to health or safety."114
To fund asbestos abatement initiatives, many cities and school
districts claimed that asbestos manufacturers were liable for public
108. 104 F.3d 1196, 1198 (9th Cir. 1997) (upholding summary judgment in
favor of defendants finding that class failed to prove special injury supporting pub-
lic nuisance action).
109. Id. at 1197 (detailing plaintiffs' claim).
110. See id. at 1198 (laying out elements private plaintiffs must prove for pub-
lic nuisance).
111. See id. (holding that plaintiffs failed to prove all elements and granting
defendants' motion for summary judgment).
112. See Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 42, at 552 (explaining personal in-
jury lawyers' attempts to use public nuisance theory in non-land cases). Unlike
products liability, public nuisance theory does not have well-defined boundaries.
Id. For example, strict liability requires that a plaintiff prove that the injury the
product caused was due to a particular defect. Id. Additionally, products liability
has stringent statutes of limitations and does not allow recovery for purely eco-
nomic loss. Id.
113. See id. at 553 (acknowledging trend in public nuisance claims alleging
product rather than use of product is public nuisance).
114. Id. at 552 (discussing public nuisance claims against manufacturers of
asbestos, tobacco and lead paint). Most commonly, plaintiffs assert public nui-
sance claims against manufacturers whose products can potentially be used incor-
rectly or illegally. Id.
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nuisance. 11 5 In Detroit Board of Education v. Celotex Corp. (Celotex), 16
a Michigan appellate court dismissed the school districts' claim that
asbestos manufacturers, installers and distributors were liable for
public nuisance. 17 The school districts claimed that the manufac-
turers should be responsible for paying the costs of removing a
harmful type of asbestos from the schools' buildings.11 8 In re-
sponse, the manufacturers asserted that their only role was to create
the product.1 9 They contended that to be liable for nuisance, a
party needed to actually have control over the nuisance, and that
imposing liability on a party who merely created the product was an
"overly broad" use of nuisance theory.' 20 According to the manu-
facturers, they abdicated control of asbestos when they sold the
product to the plaintiffs; thus, they "lack[ed] the legal right to
abate whatever hazards their products may [have] pose[d]; owner-
ship and possession [were] exclusively with [the] plaintiffs."121 The
Michigan Court of Appeals agreed with the manufacturers, and
concluded that the lower court erred in not granting the manufac-
turers' motion for summary judgment regarding the plaintiffs' nui-
sance claim. 12 2
The first time plaintiffs used public nuisance in class actions
against product manufacturers occurred in the 1990s with class ac-
115. See Gifford, supra note 73, at 745-46 (stating that traditionally public nui-
sance not regarded as tort but was way for public officials to abate harmful con-
duct). Additionally, it was rare for an individual member of the public to have the
ability to assert a public nuisance claim. Id.
116. 493 N.W.2d 513 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992).
117. See id. at 522 (holding plaintiffs failed to prove nuisance claim).
118. See id. at 517 (discussing plaintiffs' claim that they already had and would
continue to spend money to remove asbestos from buildings).
119. See id. at 521 (identifying manufacturers' argument that manufacturers
had limited role).
120. See id. at 521 (defining manufacturers' control over nuisance).
121. Celotex, 493 N.W.2d at 522 (recognizing that plaintiffs controlled nui-
sance and manufacturers could not be liable for nuisance).
122. See id. (dismissing plaintiffs' nuisance claim against asbestos manufac-
turer); see also Tioga Pub. Sch. Dist. v. United States Gypsum Co., 984 F.2d 915, 922
(8th Cir. 1993) (holding that North Dakota school district unable to successfully
assert nuisance claim against asbestos-based plaster manufacturer). Although the
school district asserted that North Dakota's nuisance statute was applicable to this
case, the court emphasized that North Dakota courts had not extended nuisance
theory to situations where a plaintiff bought a product from a manufacturer and
the product later becomes a nuisance. Id. at 920-21. Furthermore, the court
pointed out that nearly all of the cases that fell under the North Dakota nuisance
statute involved a nuisance that arose on land over which a particular landowner
had control. Id. at 920. As such, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the court im-
properly submitted the school district's nuisance claim to the jury; therefore, the
judgment in favor of the school district was set aside. Id. at 921.
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tion suits against tobacco companies. 23 Plaintiffs in the tobacco
lawsuits sought to recover costs to pay for medical programs de-
signed to treat tobacco-related problems.1 24 Nevertheless, it re-
mains a mystery whether the public nuisance theory would have
been successful because only one suit actually made it to court. 125
In Texas v. American Tobacco Co. (American Tobacco),126 a Texas
district court dismissed the State's public nuisance claim against to-
bacco manufacturers.1 27 The State complained that the manufac-
turers' tobacco products interfered with the public's right to be free
from unwarranted disease and injury. 128 The manufacturers con-
tended that the State failed to adequately claim the elements of
public nuisance; the State neither claimed that the manufacturers
misused their property, nor that the State was injured while using
the manufacturers' property.129 The United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas agreed with the manufacturers and
dismissed the State's public nuisance claim.130
Following the lead of the plaintiffs in the tobacco cases, several
plaintiffs filed public nuisance claims against firearms manufactur-
ers.' 5 ' Despite a creative twist aimed to attack the manufacturers'
marketing ploys rather than the product itself, the majority of these
claims failed.'3 2 In City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp. (Beretta),1 33
the Illinois Supreme Court dismissed the city's public nuisance
claim against several gun manufacturers and retailers.'3 4 The city
claimed that the defendants designed and marketed the firearms to
123. See Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 42, at 554 (discussing first time that
plaintiffs filed mass claims against manufacturers).
124. See id. (detailing unusual types of remedies plaintiffs sought).
125. See id. (explaining that tobacco products manufacturers' $246 billion
Master Settlement agreement with states and plaintiffs denied courts chance to
decide public nuisance claims).
126. 14 F.Supp.2d 956 (E.D. Tex. 1997). See Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note
42, at 554 (noting that American Tobacco was only case going to trial where plaintiffs
pursued public nuisance claim against tobacco manufacturers).
127. See American Tobacco, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 973 (dismissing State's claim).
128. See id. (describing State's public nuisance claim).
129. See id. (explaining manufacturers' contention that State failed to prove
elements of public nuisance).
130. See id. (dismissing State's claim).
131. See Faulk & Gray, supra note 65, at 958-59 (noting claims against firearm
manufacturers stemmed from claims against tobacco manufacturers).
132. See Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 42, at 554 (pointing out public nui-
sance claims failed despite plaintiffs' new tactics).
133. 821 N.E.2d 1099 (Ill. 2004).
134. See id. at 1148 (dismissing City's claim).
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attract buyers who intended to use them in a criminal manner. 3 5
For example, some of the firearms resisted fingerprints, were easy
to conceal and were capable of firing many rounds from just one
ammunition clip. 136 The city averred, therefore, that because the
defendants knew or should have known that these marketing and
design techniques would lead to more illegal firearms in Chicago,
the defendants were liable for public nuisance.1 3 7 The court, how-
ever, concluded that it was a personal, rather than a public right to
be free from people who commit crimes.13 8 Additionally, the court
emphasized its unwillingness to extend public nuisance theory to
cover this claim, because if it did, it would create a slippery slope
with endless claims against manufacturers.1 3 9 Accordingly, the Su-
preme Court of Illinois dismissed the city's public nuisance claim
against the defendants.1 40
In the 1980s, a team of contingency lawyers filed several unsuc-
cessful lawsuits against lead pigment manufacturers, though none
were public nuisance claims. 4 1 The Rhode Island trial court's deci-
sion in Lead Industries marked the first time lead pigment manufac-
turers were held responsible for allegedly causing childhood lead
135. See id. at 1107-08 (describing City's claim). The City also contended that
these design and marketing features served no legitimate hunting purpose. Id.
The only purpose they served was to "appeal to criminals who wish [ed] to be better
armed than other criminals or law enforcement officers." Id.
136. See id. at 1109 (discussing defendants' marketing and designs).
137. See id. at 1109 (describing City's claim).
138. See Beretta, 821 N.E.2d at 1116 (analyzing whether rights violated were
public rights or combination of individuals' rights). The court was "reluctant to
state that there is a public right to be free from the threat that some individuals
may use an otherwise legal product.. . in a manner that may create a risk of harm
to another." Id.
139. See id. (describing slippery slope for claims against manufacturers of vari-
ous products).
140. See id. at 1148 (reversing appellate court's judgment and dismissing pub-
lic nuisance claim). Although the Illinois Supreme court represents the majority
view, the Supreme Court of Indiana has held in City of Gay ex rel. King v. Smith &
Wesson Corp. that a city could proceed with a public nuisance claim against firearm
manufacturers. City of Gary ex rel. King v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 801 N.E.2d
1222, 1233 (Ind. 2003). Nonetheless, the court recognized that it was acting con-
trary to precedent because all other public nuisance claims in Indiana involved
real property. Id. at 1231. The court concluded that so long as "an activity meets
the requirements of an unreasonable interference with a public right, it may con-
stitute a public nuisance." Id. at 1233.
141. See Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 42, at 557 (discussing Ralph Nader's
efforts to hold lead pigment manufacturers liable). The state of Massachusetts
filed the first lawsuit on behalf of a few children for damages against lead pigment
manufacturers. Martha R. Mahoney, Four Million Children at Risk: Lead Paint Poison-
ing Victims and the Law, 9 STAN. EN\TL. L.J. 46, 60 (1990).
17
Berman: Rhode Island's hildhood Lead Poisoning Crisis Remains Painted Th
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2009
234 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XX: p. 217
poisoning. 142 Significantly, in the suit, the plaintiffs relied on pub-
lic nuisance theory.1 43 Nonetheless, since the Rhode Island Su-
preme Court overturned the decision, lead pigment manufacturers
have been virtually free from liability in public nuisance and prod-
ucts liability suits brought against them. 144
Recently, in In re Paint Litigation,145 the New Jersey Supreme
Court refused to expand public nuisance theory to hold former
lead pigment producers and distributors liable for the costs of find-
ing and removing lead paint from buildings.1 46 The court reasoned
that the necessary link between health problems and the defendant
manufacturers' actions in producing and distributing lead products
was missing.' 47 Additionally, the court emphasized that the private
plaintiffs failed to prove the required special injury to recover dam-
ages. 148 Finally, the court noted that this claim should have been
based in products liability, rather than public nuisance. 49 Accord-
ingly, the court granted the defendants' motion for summary judg-
ment as to public nuisance. 150
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
In Lead Industries, the Rhode Island Supreme Court reversed
the lower court's decision and dismissed the State's public nuisance
142. For a discussion on the length and importance of trial in Lead Industries,
see supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
143. For a discussion on the use of public nuisance theory in Lead Industries at
the trial level, see supra note 52 and accompanying text.
144. See Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 42, at 560 (noting success of plain-
tiffs using public nuisance theory against pigment manufacturers and distributors.
On appeal, however, appellate courts overturned virtually all of these pro-plaintiff
decisions and held in favor of defendant manufacturers and distributors. See, e.g.,
City of Chicago v. American Cyanamid Co., 823 N.E.2d 126, 139 (Il1. 2005) (holding
public nuisance theory could not legitimately be used against lead pigment manu-
facturers). See In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d 484, 501 (N.J. 2007) (recognizing no
grounds for State's public nuisance complaint against former lead paint manufac-
turers); see also City of St. Louis v. Benjamin Moore & Co., 226 S.W.3d 110, 116 (Mo.
2007) (holding City's failure to prove control element of public nuisance necessi-
tated granting summary judgment for defendant lead pigment manufacturers).
145. 924 A.2d 484 (N.J. 2007).
146. See id. at 506 (reversing lower court's judgment and entering judgment
in favor of defendants).
147. See id. at 502 (stating plaintiffs failure to prove causation element of
public nuisance).
148. See id. at 503 (recognizing plaintiff did not seek appropriate remedy
under public nuisance).
149. See id. (emphasizing claim was actually products liability claim).
150. See In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d at 506 (granting defendant's motion
for summary judgment). For examples of other courts that did not allow public
nuisance claims against pigment manufacturers, producers or distributors, see
supra note 144.
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claim against several lead pigment manufacturers. 151 The manufac-
turers argued that the public nuisance claim against them should
have been dismissed or the court should have at least awarded the
defendants a judgment as a matter of law. 152 The Supreme Court
outwardly recognized the seriousness of the childhood lead poison-
ing crisis in Rhode Island, but they stressed that "ourjudicial system
is not a panacea that can satisfy everyone who has recourse to it."'153
The court also noted that common law does change, and that grad-
ual changes in public nuisance theory may be necessary; neverthe-
less, the court refused to abandon settled principles by drastically
changing the theory in one fell swoop. 154
Rhode Island defines public nuisance as "behavior that unrea-
sonably interferes with the health, safety, peace, comfort or conve-
nience of the general community."1 55 The State failed to prove all
the elements of public nuisance, leaving the court no choice but to
dismiss the State's claim. 156
A. Public Right
The justices of the Rhode Island Supreme Court emphasized
that a public right usually refers to interference with resources that
the public shares, such as water, air and public right of ways.' 57
Consequently, because children are usually exposed to lead paint in
151. See State v. Lead Indus. Ass'n., 951 A.2d 428, 458 (R.I. 2008) (noting
court's holding).
152. See id. at 443 (outlining defendants' arguments that public nuisance
claim should be rejected).
153. Id. (quoting Ryan v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Providence, 941 A.2d 174, 188
(R.I. 2008)) (explaining court system does not fix all injuries and problems). The
court also recognized that judges are not completely free in making their deci-
sions. Id. at 436. Rather, ajudge "is to exercise a discretion informed by tradition,
methodized by analogy, disciplined by system, and subordinated to the 'primordial
necessity of order in social life.'" Id. (quoting Benjamin N. Cardozo, THE NATURE
OF THE JUDICLAL PROCESS 141 (Yale Univ. Press 1921) (1921)).
154. See id. at 446 (explaining incremental and gradual nature of changes in
common law prevents courts from making drastic changes).
155. Id. (quoting Citizens for Pres. of Watermelon Lake v. Davis, 420 A.2d 53, 59
(R.I. 1980) (laying out Rhode Island's definition of public nuisance). For the ele-
ments of public nuisance, see infra note 156.
156. For a discussion of the State's failure to prove the elements of public
nuisance, see supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text. Rhode Island's elements
of public nuisance are as follows: "(1) an unreasonable interference; (2) with a
right common to the general public; (3) by a person or people with control over
the instrumentality alleged to have created the nuisance when the damage oc-
curred." Lead industries, 951 A.2d at 452. If a plaintiff proves all elements, the
plaintiff must then prove the defendant actually and proximately caused the nui-
sance. Id. Furthermore, to date, Rhode Island courts have recognized that public
nuisance occurs when someone used land improperly. Id. at 453.
157. See Lead Industries, 951 A.2d at 453 (describing typical public nuisance).
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their own homes and other private settings, the right not to be
poisoned by lead is a private right, not a public one.1 58 In recogniz-
ing the grave threat of the slippery slope laid out in Beretta, the
Supreme Court refused to expand the definition of a public right to
cover the situation at issue.' 59
B. Control
A party "must have control over the instrumentality causing the
alleged nuisance at the time the damage occurs."'160 It is imperative
that the defendant have control of the nuisance at the time of the
claim, because the primary remedy for public nuisance is abate-
ment. 61 For the State's public nuisance claim in Lead Industries to
have proceeded, the State would have needed to prove that the de-
fendants manufactured and controlled the lead pigment at the
time it poisoned the children.' 62 The court found that the State
failed to prove the required element of control. 163
C. Unreasonable Interference
Interference with a public right usually involves violating a stat-
ute or ordinance; if a particular activity substantially interferes with
a public right, however, courts have generally found such an activity
to be unreasonable, even if it does not violate a written law. 164
Plaintiffs have the burden of proving that a defendant's legal act is
unreasonable.' 65 Yet, a court will not determine whether an act is
unreasonable based on a pre-determined formula; rather, the court
looks at all the facts in a particular situation to determine if an act is
unreasonable. 166 In Lead Industries, the State failed to prove that a
child's right not to be poisoned by lead constitutes a public right. 167
158. See id. at 454 (explaining right not to be lead-poisoned is private right).
159. See id. at 454-55 (declining to characterize right of children not to be
poisoned by lead as public right). See also City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821
N.E.2d 1099, 1116 (Ill. 2004) (discussing Illinois' Supreme Court's refusal to ex-
tend public nuisance theory against firearm manufacturers and retailers).
160. Lead Industries, 951 A.2d 428 at 449 (explaining element of control).
161. See id. (discussing importance of control so abatement remedy is logical).
162. See id. at 455 (demonstrating how element of control could have been
met in case).
163. See id. (detailing state's failure to prove control element).
164. See id. at 447 (expanding definition of unreasonable interference).
165. See Lead Industries, 951 A.2d at 447 (describing burden of proof in public
nuisance claim).
166. See id. (defining court's method of determining reasonableness of partic-
ular activity).
167. See id. at 455 (emphasizing lack of public right requirement).
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As such, the court did not need to determine the reasonableness of
the defendants' conduct.1 68
D. Related to Land
The court recognized that actions for public nuisance in
Rhode Island had only related to land. 169 Specifically, "a public
nuisance typically arises on a defendant's land and interferes with a
public right."'70 To that end, the court ruled that the Rhode Island
Superior Court erred because it strayed too far from the established
requirements of common law public nuisance, which involved land
use. 171 According to the court, no matter how harmful a product
may be, public nuisance theory does not apply to the manufacture
of products. 172 The court instead concluded that the proper claim
would be one set in products liability.' 73
E. Causation
Plaintiffs that assert a public nuisance must also show that the
nuisance complained of caused the injury. 174 A party will therefore
only be held liable if the "conduct complained of actually caused an
interference with a public right."175 Additionally, plaintiffs must
prove proximate causation, which is a cause that is so closely related
to the injury that a reasonable person would foresee the injury "as a
likely result of [the] conduct."1 76 In Lead Industries, the court held
that the State did not prove the prior elements of public nuisance,
and therefore did not need to address the element of causation. 177
Ultimately, because the State failed to prove more than one of the
168. See id. (explaining if public right not proved, court need not address
reasonableness of defendants' behavior).
169. See id. at 452 (pointing out necessity of land in public nuisance claims).
170. Lead Industries, 951 A.2d at 452 (noting that public nuisance traditionally
involves land).
171. See id. at 455 (stating lower court's departure from common law).
172. See id. at 456 (denying use of public nuisance in case).
173. See id. (suggesting state should have filed products liability claim). The
state also appealed the Rhode Island Superior Court's denial of compensatory
damages as well as the court's grant of ajudgment as a matter of law to one partic-
ular lead pigment manufacturer. Id. at 458-59. Additionally, both parties ap-
pealed contempt of court issues. Id. at 459-68.
174. See id. at 450-51 (explaining causation).
175. Lead Industries, 951 A.2d at 451 (discussing when element of cause is met
in public nuisance claim).
176. Id. (describing element of proximate causation).
177. See id. at 455 (explaining court need not address all elements if first ele-
ments not met).
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necessary elements of public nuisance, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court dismissed the State's public nuisance claim. 178
V. CRITIcAL ANALYSIS
Although the court in Lead Industries properly dismissed the
State's public nuisance claim under applicable law, this decision left
a hole in the hearts of the justices, and exposed a major flaw in the
law.179
A. State's Failure to Prove Public Nuisance Elements
To be liable for public nuisance in Rhode Island, a plaintiff
must prove: (1) the defendant unreasonably interfered with a pub-
lic right; (2) the defendant had control over the alleged nuisance;
and (3) the defendant actually and proximately caused the alleged
nuisance. 180 In this case, the State failed to prove all three
elements.181
In American Tobacco, a Texas district court concluded that the
tobacco manufacturers did not unreasonably interfere with a public
right, because the State failed to prove the manufacturers misused
their property. 182 Analogous to the tobacco manufacturers, the
lead paint manufacturers did not misuse their property; they simply
manufactured a legal product. 18 3 Moreover, similar to the defend-
ants in Celotex, who legally produced and distributed asbestos, the
defendants in Lead Industries legally produced and distributed lead
178. For the Rhode Island Supreme Court's holding, see supra note 151 and
accompanying text.
179. For the court's holding, see supra note 151. See also Lead Industries, 951
A.2d at 435 (stressing justices' reactions about holding in case). The court noted,
"[i]n reaching this conclusion, we do not mean to minimize the severity of the
harm that thousands of children in Rhode Island have suffered as a result of lead
poisoning. Our hearts go out to those children whose lives forever have been
changed by the poisonous presence of lead." Id. The court then stressed that
although the childhood lead poisoning crisis is quite serious, "public nuisance law
simply does not provide a remedy for this harm." Id.
180. For a discussion on the public nuisance elements, see supra notes 60-61
and accompanying text.
181. For the court's holding, see supra note 151.
182. For a discussion on the lack of misuse of property in the tobacco manu-
facturer case and the court's holding, see supra notes 131-40 and accompanying
text.
183. For an example of when merely manufacturing asbestos- a legal product
at the time- did not constitute a public nuisance, see supra notes 115-122 and ac-
companying text. See also City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099,
1116 (Il1. 2004) (warning against extending public nuisance to hold manufacturers
liable for producing legal products).
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pigment.184 After the manufacturers sold the product, they no
longer maintained control over it.185
The right to be free from health problems is a private right,
not a public one, because one's health is specific to each and every
individual.'i 6 On the contrary, historically recognized public fights
have included rights which we share publicly, such as the right to
clean water and unpolluted air.187 Although people unlawfully
used firearms in Beretta, the court emphasized that the right to be
free from people who commit crimes is not a public right.188 Mu-
nicipalities, landlords and homeowners responsible for the upkeep
of schools and other public buildings have failed, and continue to
fail, to remove dilapidated lead paint from their properties. i 9 Al-
though children have the indisputable right to be free from the
damage that chipped paint and paint dust cause, this is not a public
right, but a private right of each and every individual child.1 90
Nevertheless, even if the court concluded there was a public
right, the alleged nuisance did not occur until the lead paint
chipped, turned into dust and became unavoidable for children to
inhale and ingest.19' Unless the pigment manufacturers owned or
controlled these properties when the paint chipped and the chil-
dren ingested the residue, it is questionable at best whether the
manufacturers actually caused the nuisance.1 92 Moreover, it is an
184. For a discussion on the legality of selling lead paint for residential use
prior to 1978, see supra note 44.
185. See State v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 941 A.2d 428, 455 (R.I. 2008) (concluding
that state failed to prove manufacturers had control over alleged nuisance).
186. See id. at 447-48 (comparing and citing examples of private and public
rights). The court emphasized the difference between a public right and an aggre-
gation of private rights. Id. at 448.
187. For a discussion on the traditional meaning of a public right, see supra
note 67 and accompanying text. See also Lead Industries, 941 A.2d at 447-48 (dis-
cussing definitions of public right as currently applied).
188. For a discussion about an Illinois court's decision that being free from
those who commit crimes is a private right, see supra notes 138-40 and accompany-
ing text.
189. See, e.g. Misti Crane & Mark Ferenchik, Banned Three Decades Ago, Lead
Paint Continues to Poison Ohio's Children, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, May 11, 2008, availa-
ble at http://www.dispatch.com/live/content/localnews/stories/2008/05/1 I /
LEADED.ARTART_05-11-08_AlSTA5K8A.html (providing example of city that
has failed to adequately remove lead paint from homes and reasons for failure).
190. See Lead Industries, 951 A.2d at 454 (discussing similarity between child's
right to be free from health hazards lead paint causes with other nonpublic
rights).
191. See Cleveland Clinic, http://my.clevelandclinic.org/disorders/Lead
Poisoning/hicLeadPoisoning.aspx (last visited Feb. 15, 2009) (describing when
lead paint harms children).
192. For the elements of public nuisance, see supra notes 60-61. Moreover,
"legal responsibility must be limited to those causes which are so closely connected
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illogical and inappropriate leap to conclude that the manufacturers
controlled the chipped paint when it harmed the children. 9 3
Rhode Island had a legitimate, idealistic goal to remove all re-
maining lead pigment in buildings, and tried to find a way to make
someone pay for the undue harm lead paint already caused Rhode
Island's children. 194 This, however, did not grant the court the
power to embellish traditional public nuisance law to hold the man-
ufacturers responsible for a nuisance they did not create. 19 5 Ac-
cordingly, the Rhode Island Supreme Court properly dismissed the
State's public nuisance claim. 19 6
B. The Ineffectiveness of Products Liability Theory in Suits
against Product Manufacturers
Most often, plaintiffs will request that courts impose strict lia-
bility when attempting to recover from manufacturers under prod-
ucts liability theory. 197 According to the Second Restatement, the first
element a plaintiff must prove under strict liability is that the defen-
dant sold a "product in a defective condition unreasonably danger-
with the result and of such significance that the law is justified in imposing liabil-
ity." W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41 (5th
ed. 1984) (explaining elements of causation). "Liability cannot be predicated on a
prior and remote cause which merely furnishes the condition or occasion for an
injury resulting from an intervening unrelated and efficient cause, even though
the injury would not have resulted but for such a condition or occasion..." Cle-
ments v. Tashjoin, 168 A.2d 472, 475 (R.I. 1961) (discussing causation issues) (in-
ternal citation omitted).
193. For a discussion on a New Jersey case that refused to overextend public
nuisance theory, see supra notes 145-50. For a discussion on The Supreme Court
of Rhode Island's refusal to extend public nuisance theory in Lead Industries, see
supra notes 153-56.
194. For a discussion of the Rhode Island trial court's strategy in Lead Indus-
tries, see supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
195. For a discussion on a New York court that held in favor of the plaintiffs
because it was a means to a desired end, see supra notes 100-07 and accompanying
text. Nevertheless, the court in Lead industries stressed that the "enormous leap
that the state urge[d] [it] to take is wholly inconsistent with the widely recognized
principle that the evolution of the common law should occur gradually, predict-
ably, and incrementally." State v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 451 A.2d 428, 454 (R.I. 2008).
Because all of the traditional elements of public nuisance were not met, the court
was unwilling to take a huge step to hold the lead pigment manufacturers liable.
Id. See also supra note 153 (pointing out that judges do not have power to solve all
social problems).
196. For the court's holding in Lead Industries, see supra note 151 and accom-
panying text.
197. See Brady L. Montalbano, Comment, It's Not Easy Being Green- Holding
Manufacturers of Genetically Modified Bentgrass Liable Under Strict Products Liability, 14
PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REv. 111, 119 (2005) (noting that strict liability is most often
used in products liability cases).
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ous to the user or consumer or to his property." 198 If a sufficient
causal link exists between the defendant's actions and the harm,
the defendant could then be liable for physical harm that the prod-
uct might cause to the consumer or the consumer's property. 199
When applying strict liability to lead pigment manufacturers,
the analysis abruptly ends, because the lead pigment was likely not
defective when the manufacturers produced it.20 0 Even if it was de-
fective, the causal link between the lead-poisoned children and the
defendants' actions in producing the lead pigment is too remote.
20 1
Although several courts have suggested that claims against manu-
facturers were better set in products liability, such an approach
would not have been successful in Lead Industries.202
C. Public Nuisance and Products Liability Theories Fail - Now
What?
History shows that, save for a few exceptions, public nuisance
claims against manufacturers have proved futile. 20 3 Additionally,
198. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) (noting requirement
that product must be defective to use strict liability theory).
199. See id. (stating if the product is defective manufacturer can be liable if
other requirements are met).
200. For a discussion on types of defects, see infra note 201.
201. See Montalbano, supra note 197, at 122 (discussing defect element and
causation requirements). There are three types of defects: manufacturing defect,
design defect and failure to warn defect. Id. The defect must be one that is "un-
reasonably dangerous" to assert a claim under strict products liability. Id. The
unreasonableness of the defect is measured by what a reasonable consumer with a
reasonable amount of knowledge would think about the defectiveness of the prod-
uct. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965). For a discussion on
the federal ban on retail of lead paint for indoor use, see supra note 44. Moreover,
a plaintiff must prove the element of causation to effectively assert a products lia-
bility claim. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). For a further dis-
cussion on the element of causation, see also supra note 192.
202. For an example of an unsuccessful use of products liability theory against
lead paint manufacturers, see supra note 149. For details on elements that a plain-
tiff must prove to prevail in a products liability claim, see supra note 201. See also
72A C.J.S. Products Liability § 162 (2008) (demonstrating plaintiff can assert prod-
ucts liability claim under two theories). Moreover, in 1993, the Supreme Court of
Rhode Island held that all products liability suits for personal injuries had a three-
year statute of limitations period. Pirri v. Toledo Scale Corp., 619 A.2d 429, 431
(R.I. 1993). A plaintiff, therefore, would have to assert a products liability claim
within three years after the product allegedly harmed the plaintiff. See Leo J.
Wold, Revisiting Rhode Island's Statute of Limitations for Products Liability Actions In-
volving Personal Injuries: Pirri v. Toledo Scale Corp., 619 A.2D 429 (R.I. 1993), 27 SuF-
FOLK U. L.REv. 377, 377 (1993) (discussing implications of court's holding). See
also R.I. GEN. LAwS § 9-1-14 (2008) (demonstrating applicable statute of limitations
for products liability actions).
203. See generally Detroit Bd. of Educ. v. Celotex Corp., 493 N.W.2d 513 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1992) (concluding asbestos manufacturers were not liable for public nui-
sance); Texas v. Am. Tobacco Co., 14 F.Supp. 2d 956 (E.D. Tex. 1997) (holding to-
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the rigid elements necessary to prove products liability render the
theory inapplicable to a state's claim against lead pigment manufac-
turers.20 4 The follow-up question therefore becomes: now what?
What adequate remedy does the court system presently provide to
innocent children, who were in the wrong place at the wrong time
and became the unfortunate victims of lead poisoning? Gertrude
Stein's blunt words are extremely apropos in this situation, "There
ain't no answer. There ain't gonna be any answer. There never has
been an answer. That's the answer."205
VI. IMPACT
Before the Lead Industries decision, Rhode Island's court system
remained the only glimmer of hope to those fighting for a success-
ful use of public nuisance theory against product manufacturers. 20 6
The reversal of the lower court's decision, however, significantly
lessened the chance for public nuisance theory to be used effec-
tively against product manufacturers in the future. 20 7 The decision
also eliminated the possibility that former lead paint manufacturers
would pay both healthcare costs for lead-poisoned children and
costs to remove lead paint from Rhode Island homes and
buildings.2 08
Yet, the decision, albeit disconcerting, did not eradicate future
strategies to address childhood lead poisoning. Since Rhode Island
enacted legislation to regulate lead paint in residential areas, the
number of newly lead-poisoned children has decreased signifi-
bacco manufacturers were not liable for public nuisance); City of Chicago v. Beretta
U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E. 2d 1099 (Ill. 2004) (dismissing public nuisance claim against
firearm manufacturers).
204. For a discussion on products liability theory, see supra note 202 and ac-
companying text.
205. T.J. MACGREGOR, KILL TIME 307 (Kate Duffy ed., 2007) (quoting Ger-
trude Stein).
206. For examples of cases where public nuisance claims against manufactur-
ers proved to be inefficient, see supra note 203.
207. See Peter B. Lord, R. High Court Overturns Lead-paint Verdict, PROVIDENCE
J., July 2, 2008, available at http://www.projo.com/business/content/Paint suit_
07-02-08_SEANHTMv41.403bac8.html (noting that "[l]awyers said the decision
will likely dampen the zeal other states and municipalities have expressed for filing
similar suits.").
208. For the Rhode Island Supreme Court's holding, see supra note 151 and
accompanying text. After spending an inordinate amount of money and time liti-
gating this case and winning, it would be almost unheard of for the defendants to
then voluntarily pay the plaintiffs. Lord, supra note 207. One lawyer said, "[t]he
state cut spending on lead abatement in half this year [2008], to about $650,000,
because it anticipated getting some help from the companies. Now... it will have
to look to other sources." Id.
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candy.20 9 Given that legislation has made a dent in the childhood
lead poisoning crisis, and manufacturers will not pay to correct lead
poisoning, it is possible that Rhode Island's legislature will enact
new and improved environmental laws to further address the child-
hood lead poisoning crisis.2 10 Regardless, one lead-poisoned child
is one too many; but the unfortunate truth is that most individuals
or states do not have the power, skills or resources to completely
eliminate childhood lead poisoning. 21 1
In an ideal world, money would not be an issue in rectifying
childhood lead poisoning. Everyone would have the knowledge
and means to be able to identify and safely remove lead paint from
their own homes. Additionally, the attempted removal of lead
paint would not come with the risks of causing further health
hazards. 212 In reality, however, neither individuals nor Rhode Is-
land's government has the means to effectively remove the lead
paint.213 Furthermore, attempts to remove it can also result in the
209. For a discussion on the positive effects of lead paint legislation, see supra
note 48 and accompanying text.
210. For a discussion on the success of lead paint legislation, see supra note
48.
211. See generally Giegengack et al., An Educational Strategy to Reduce Exposure of
Urban Children to Environmental Lead: ENVS 404 at the University of Pennsylvania, in
ACTING LOcALLY: CONCEPTS AND MODELS FOR SERVICE LEARNING IN ENVIRONMENTAL
STUDIES 120 (Harold Ward ed., 1999) (providing example of significant monetary
costs in removing lead paint from homes). Specifically, "[t]he cost of mechanical
abatement of interior lead-based paint is currently about $15,000/house, or $6
billion to remove lead paint from only the interior surfaces of all affected houses
in Philadelphia." Id. at 124. Additionally, research shows that "careless abatement
may actually increase exposure to environmental lead by converting much of the
removed paint to interior dust that then adheres to freshly cleaned surfaces, to be
picked up by sticky little hands." Id. During Lead Industries, the State estimated
that it would cost 2.4 billion dollars to "cleanup" Rhode Island's lead paint prob-
lem. Debra Cassens Weiss, Rhode Island Supreme Court Overturns Verdict Against Lead
Paint Makers, A.B.A. J., July 1, 2008, http://www.abajournal.com/news/rhodeis-
lan dsupreme-court_overturns verdict against lead-paint makers/. Neverthe-
less, there are some less expensive ways to reduce some of the hazards associated
with lead paint. See PIERRE ERVILLE, WEATHERIZATION REHAB ASSET PRES. P'SHIP,
ISSUE BRIEF: STRATEGIES FOR ADDRESSING PAINT ABATEMENT IN Low-INCOME
WEATHERIZATION AND REHIAB 3 (2004) (discussing costs associated with lead abate-
ment). Only in extreme situations would it cost "tens of thousands of dollars to
remove all lead paint from a large, free-standing single-family home." Id. Today, it
is more common to use a technique that involves paint stabilization and lead dust
cleanup. Id. "Paint stabilization entails wet scraping the old paint off (to avoid
dust generation), and then repainting with non-lead paint." Id. This method is
much less expensive and still is able to reduce some of the health hazards lead
paint poses. Id.
212. For a discussion on hazards and costs of lead paint removal, see supra
note 211 and accompanying text.
213. For a discussion on the costs of removing lead paint from buildings, see
supra note 211.
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creation of a more hazardous environment for children.21 4 Never-
theless, there are realistic steps to take in order to reduce the ef-
fects of this intense environmental problem.21 5 While schools can
continue to educate children and their families about the harm of
lead poisoning, the government can provide assistance so the pub-
lic can protect itself against such harm.216 Moreover, the Rhode
Island legislature can enact additional legislation to protect low-in-
come individuals if they inquire or complain to their landlords
about the presence of lead in their homes. 2 17 In such a scenario,
courts would be required to enforce the laws which the legislature
creates.
2 18
As the Rhode Island Supreme Court aptly concluded in Lead
Industries,
[This] was a hard case-hard not in the sense that it [was]
legally difficult or tough to crack, but in the sense that it
[required the justices] to deny relief to a plaintiff for
whom [they had] considerable sympathy. [They had to]
for it is the duty of all courts ofjustice to take care, for the
general good of the community, that hard cases do not
make bad law. 2 19
214. For a discussion on hazards of lead removal, see supra note 211.
215. For a discussion on steps to take to minimize childhood lead poisoning,
see infra notes 216-18 and accompanying text.
216. For an example of a resource that teachers can use to help educate
young children about the dangers of lead poisoning, see Sesameworkshop, http://
www.sesameworkshop.org/initiatives/health/lead (last visited Feb. 20, 2009) (pro-
viding video and written information about lead's dangers). See Erville, supra note
211, at 2 (noting several federal programs that exist to provide grants so that low-
income homeowners can afford to make home rehabilitations). Some of these
programs also provide grants "to support lead abatement work." Id. Additionally,
the Rhode Island Department of Health has information available on the internet
so that the public can learn the requirements and ways to make their homes safe.
Rhode Island Department of Health, Lead Poisoning Prevention Program, http://
www.health.ri.gov/lead/renovating.php (last visited Feb. 16, 2008).
217. See generally Paula Beck, Comment, Fighting Section 8 Discrimination: The
Fair Housing Act's New Frontier, 31 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 155 (1996) (discussing
landlord discriminating against low-income tenants).
218. For a discussion on effective legislation reducing childhood lead poison-
ing, see supra note 48 and accompanying text.
219. State v. Lead Indus. Ass'n., 951 A.2d 428, 480-81 (R.I. 2008) (quoting
Burnham v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 873 F.2d 486, 487 (1st Cir. 1989)).
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And so, for the time being, Rhode Island's lead poisoning crisis
remains painted thickly on the wall.
Jenna Berman*
* J.D. Candidate, 2010, Villanova University School of Law; B.S., 2007, Univer-
sity of Maryland - College Park.
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